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A sec u r it y f ra mework proposed by Ad a m Shostack simplifies threat modeling by ask-ing four questions:1
1. What are we working on?
2. What can go wrong?
3. What are we going to do about it? 
4. Did we do a good job?
While the first and last questions 
may be easier to answer, the second 
and third questions require substan-
tial effort to address. To answer the 
second question, Shostack proposes 
using the STRIDE method to iden-
tify potential threats. This method 
invites scientists and engineers to 
imagine how common attack meth-
ods such as spoofing, tampering, re-
pudiation, information disclosure, 
denial of service (DoS), and escala-
tion of privilege may be used to tar-
get a system. For simple systems, this may be effective, but 
it is not an efficient method for brainstorming threats for a 
complex system such as mobile telephony.
Addressing the security risks for mobile telephony is 
a multidisciplinary endeavor. The prevailing practice of 
examining methodologies and how attacks might be ap-
plied does not result in an intuitive representation of attack 
vectors usable by most experts in areas other than secu-
rity. We believe that an improved approach to identifying 
potential threats to mobile telephony, consistent with the 
four-question framework, is to categorize attacks in terms 
of attack vectors and their relationship to the user plane (UP), 
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control plane (CP), and their interac-
tions throughout the radio front-end 
and the core network. Our proposed 
matrix can aggregate more detailed 
taxonomies in the literature to enable 
unified views of what can go wrong 
and facilitate decisions on what to do 
about it.
5G MOBILE TELEPHONY
The fifth generation of mobile telephony, 
also known as new radio (5G NR), prom-
ises increased bandwidth, reduced 
latency, customizability, and greater 
cellular coverage. The apps envisioned 
for 5G can be broadly categorized into 
three use cases: enhanced mobile broad-
band, massive machine-type commu-
nication, and ultrareliable low-latency 
communication. Examples of planned 
apps include vehicle-to-everything (V2X) 
communication, smart cities with net-
worked sensors, and mobile streaming 
of 3D video with ultrahigh resolution 
and ultra-reliable low-latency commu-
nication. 5G virtualized many services 
of the previous generations and created 
app-specific, virtual network slices that 
specify performance and cybersecurity 
requirements—a significant advance. But 
5G systems have also become complex in 
the quest to enable the flexibility to meet 
anticipated functional and performance 
requirements over the next 10 years. 6G 
may introduce additional complexity 
with its move from centralized service 
provisioning to a decentralized network 
and service architecture.
With the rapid adoption of 5G NR, one 
might assume that stakeholders have al-
ready thoroughly scrubbed 5G NR arti-
facts (for example, standards, protocols, 
architecture, and designs) for security 
vulnerabilities, although recent stud-
ies indicate otherwise.2,3 Others have 
enumerated security vulnerabilities in 
5G,4–6 but the current taxonomies and 
threat models suffer from drawbacks, 
including complex methodologies that 
can be difficult for nonsecurity experts 
to rapidly apply. Some of these other tax-
onomies also afford limited flexibility to 
adapt to changes in technology, architec-
ture, design, and usage.
Each engineering and science disci-
pline involved in mobile telephony con-
tributes in some way to understanding 
and assessing the security risks within 
the overall engineering tradeoff space. 
A common, easily graspable taxonomy 
to categorize the threats, which parts of 
the network they affect, and where they 
originate is necessary to facilitate the 
effective engagement and investment of 
resources spread across the research, de-
velopment, sustainment, and defense of 
the mobile telephony infrastructure.
Accordingly, we developed a threat-
matrix-based approach to the cate-
gorization of attacks based on attack 
vectors instead of methods. The ap-
proach is straightforward to use and 
adaptable. Let’s take a look at how the 
approach can be applied to 5G NR.
5G NR ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 illustrates the key components 















NEF UDM PCF NRF
AUSF AMF SMF NSSF
gNB
FIGURE 1. An overview of the 5G network architecture. SBI: service-based infrastructure; UE: user equipment; UPF: UP function; UDM: unified 
data management; AMF: access and mobility management function; SMF: session management function; NEF: network exposure function; 
AUSF: authentication server function; PCF: policy control function; NRF: network repository function; NSSF: network slice selection function.
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architecture organizes telephony ca-
pabilities as being in the CP or UP in 
addition to specifying the relationships 
between the two planes. The specific 
implementation of any 5G network 
may differ between service providers 
and granularity can be added (such as 
an access plane).
The CP in Figure 1 consists of the 5G 
core and CP functions (CPFs), the logical 
connections N1 and N2 to the UE and log-
ical radio nodes known as gNBs, and the 
N4 connections to the UPF. CPFs in the 5G 
core communicate with one another via 
HTTP/2 queries and responses over the 
SBI bus. For the interested reader, more 
details are contained in “Additional De-
tails on 5G Architecture.”
The UP of Figure 1 consists of the 
UE, radio access network (RAN), UPF, 
and the connections N3, N6, and N9. 
Within the RAN, the actual mechanism 
by which the base station (gNB) inter-
acts with the core network depends on 
the mode of operation and equipment 
involved. It could consist of a simple 
gNB such as in Figure 1 or multiple ra-
dio units (RUs) working together as a 
single, virtual gNB to provide integrated 
access and backhaul (IAB), as depicted 
in Figure 2.
In a 5G deployment, the UP may 
consist of a single gNB or multiple 
gNBs as well as a single UPF or multi-
ple UPFs. IAB provisioning itself is a 
potential UP attack (UPA) target.
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON 5G ARCHITECTURE 
RADIO ACCESS NETWORK (RAN) 
Per our approach, the access plane (consisting primarily of the RAN) is rolled into the UP. The Open RAN Alliance 
(O-RAN ALLIANCE) splits the RAN into three parts by separat-
ing the functional modules that compose a single logical ra-
dio node (gNB): the radio unit (RU), distributed unit (DU), and 
centralized unit (CU). In 5G literature, fronthaul refers to the 
link between the RU and DU, midhaul to the link between the 
DU and CU, and backhaul to the link between the CU and the 
5G core network. This split, illustrated in Figure 2, supports 
integrated access and backhaul, promotes interoperability 
among vendors’ implementations of these modules within 
the RAN, and can (or will) be used to provide complementary 
services such as optimized traffic flow based on artificial 
intelligence techniques.S1 The additional computing power 
available in the RAN enables the creation of new services 
further away from the core network—these are called mobile 
edge services.
UP 
The N1 and N2 connections are used to pass information to 
and from the CPFs by the UE and gNB, respectively. As depicted 
in Figure 2, the UPF can be further classified by its connection 
to other UP features. The packet data session anchor UPF con-
nects to a gNB via the N3 link, and the intermediate UPF (IUPF) 
connects to another UPF via the N9 link. The IUPF connected 
to an external data network such as the Internet via the N6 link 
may also support inter public land mobile network UP security to 
protect the network from incoming malicious traffic.S2
CP 
Important CPFs include the AMF, SMF, and UDM. The AMF 
controls the process for new UE and gNBs to connect to the 
5G network and UE handoffs between gNBs. Within the 
CP, the destination for information carried over the N1 and 
N2 connections is the AMF. Upon the UE’s request, the SMF 
creates, updates, and terminates sessions as permitted by the 
AMF and manages the session context with the UPF over the 
N4 connection. The UDM replaces the home subscriber server 
in the 4G standard; it manages user data and authentication 
credentials. Further information on CPFs is found in 3GPP 
Technical Specification 23.501; network functions and enti-
ties are listed in clause 4.2.2, and further details about each 
network function are in clause 6.2.S2
NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION  
AND NETWORK SLICING 
Instead of each network function residing on separate ma-
chines, the network functions share common hardware and 
become virtual network functions (VNFs). While this concept 
has been applied to some 4G networks, it will be fully adopted 
in 5G, including within the RAN.4 This is evident in the decou-
pling of gNB functionality, as previously discussed. A network 
slice can thus be thought of as all of the related VNFs servicing 
a certain network app. For instance, a server rack may contain a 
network slice for a massive machine-type communication net-
work for the factory floor and another slice for an ultrareliable 
low-latency communication network for connecting supervi-
sors to multiple geographically dispersed factory floors.
References
S1. “Open RAN explained.” Nokia, Espoo, Finland, Oct. 16, 2020. 
[Online]. Available: www.nokia.com/about-us/newsroom/articles/
open-ran-explained
S2. “System architecture for the 5G system (5GS).” 3GPP, Sophia Anti-
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In addition to the changes in net-
work architecture, 5G introduces or 
improves various security mecha-
nisms. These measures include en-
crypting the International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity (IMSI) whenever it is 
required to be transmitted over the air, 
limiting which network functions have 
access to the IMSI (as part of the Sub-
scription Permanent Identifier), and 
the improved 5G Authentication and 
Key Agreement protocol.7,8 A deeper 
investigation of the security architec-
ture for 5G is beyond the scope of this 
article. Instead, we focus on how our 
methodology can be applied to mobile 
telephony, using a brief overview of the 




Much of the literature on the security 
of mobile telephony centers on at-
tack methods instead of the origins or 
targets of attacks. While approaches 
from MITRE and the European Union 
Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) may 
help to consolidate attack vectors 
based upon objectives or methods 
such as outages5 or credential access,6 
these approaches do not adequately 
address complex systems such as 5G 
in which functionality is partitioned 
among multiple planes. For example, 
a DoS attack (that is, an outage) could 
be utilized against a gNB to prevent 
access within a network cell or against 
a service provider’s UDM to prevent 
access to an entire network. 
Although these attacks have the 
same objective (outage) and method 
(target gNB), the attacks differ in their 
implementation and effect. Similarly, 
credential access could potentially be 
accomplished both in the UP as well 
as the CP. Thus, while binning attack 
vectors on the method is convenient, 
it does not provide sufficient clarity to 
the network engineers, who are con-
stantly refining the standards, and the 
vendors and service providers, who 
are constantly refining the UE and in-
frastructure. Binning on methodology 
also requires a more complex taxon-
omy that is difficult to visualize.
Considering that the CP and UP 
split is fundamental to 5G, we instead 
propose the approach described in Ta-
ble 1 that bins attack vectors based on 
their source and targeted function 
[that is, a UPA or CP attack (CPA)] 
within these two planes. This sim-
plified top-level model provides for 
aggregating many of the more de-
tailed taxonomies in the literature, 
such as ENISA5 and ATT&CK Mo-
bile,6 and can assist stakeholders in 
forming their own mental models of 
security risks.
To account for the complexity of 
the multiplane system, the user of the 
matrix categorizes the attack vectors 
based on the plane of their origin (UP 
or CP) and the type of attack (UPA or 
CPA), as shown in Table 1. In a CPA, the 
targeted function or feature lies in the 
CP, whereas in a UPA, the function or 
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gNB
FIGURE 2. The disaggregation of RAN functions for IAB. DU: distributed unit; CU: centralized unit; PSA-UPF: packet data session anchor 
UPF; IUPF: intermediate UPF; IAB-MT: integrated access and backhaul mobile termination; vIAB-MT: virtual IAB-MT. 
TABLE 1. The proposed 5G attack vector matrix.
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The following sections analyze se-
lected attack methods (recently pro-
posed as well as legacy) and examine 
how they might be applied to mobile 
telephony, specifically against a 5G 
network. These attack methods are 
then fleshed out into more specific at-
tack vectors and, in turn, categorized 
within our proposed taxonomy. While 
some of these legacy attack vectors 
presented may not be viable against a 
5G network, we use them to illustrate 
our taxonomy. Used in conjunction 
with Shostack’s framework, one can 
assess the policies and mechanisms for 
mitigating the security risks of 5G in 
addition to assessing the goodness of 
the underlying trust assumptions for 
the security architecture. The power 
of categorizing attacks based on attack 
vectors is in presenting a simplified 
visualization of weaknesses in the mo-
bile telephony architecture to facilitate 
threat discovery. We believe that some 
of the first attack vectors employed 
against 5G networks will be derivatives 
of legacy attack vectors.
CPAs 
The proprietary nature by which in-
dividual organizations implement CP 
features may deter unsophisticated or 
poorly funded would-be attackers. His-
tory, however, teaches us that security 
through obscurity is inadequate. In ad-
dition, the network functions and large 
repositories of information are likely to 
be tempting targets for attackers. The 
5G CP will also be the most complex, 
and history also shows that each added 
feature typically introduces bugs (that 
is, vulnerabilities or weaknesses) and 
dependencies; some of the weaknesses 
may be exploitable for cyberattacks. 
Finally, the diversity of services and 
dynamic reconfigurability envisioned 
in 5G will require extensive virtualiza-
tion in control nodes and many more 
edge control nodes. The net result of 
these changes significantly increases 
both the attack surface and access vec-
tors to the 5G CP. 
Network function spoofing
The use of software-defined network-
ing and network function virtualiza-
tion to create multiple app-specific 
network slices will rely on configu-
rations and updates that traverse the 
Internet using well-documented and 
recognized network protocols (for ex-
ample, HTTP/2, TCP, and IP). A capa-
ble adversary could insert itself into 
the routing chain and determine the 
location and functions contained in 
a particular network slice. Instead of 
probing and exploiting vulnerabili-
ties within the network slice applica-
tion programming interface and func-
tions, they could redirect 5G traffic 
from a particular RAN to a spoofed net-
work core, thus enabling the collection 
of information for all connected UE 
and the manipulation of any network 
function within the slice.
Database record access 
and manipulation
Using an initial methodology simi-
lar to network function spoofing, an 
adversary could exploit a vulnerabil-
ity within the network slice instead 
of simulating the entire slice. Such 
attacks are potentially more damag-
ing because the effects could be more 
difficult to detect and longer lasting. 
A spoofed slice or database is fixed 
by reestablishing the proper connec-
tions, but one that is manipulated re-
quires additional effort to determine 
the scope of corruption of the database 
and restore its integrity.
Signaling interception, 
manipulation, and jamming
The radio frequencies associated with 
5G are tremendously diverse. Fre-
quency bands are deployed differently 
by country, but low- and midbands 
with longer propagation paths start 
at about 600 MHz (for low bands) and 
2.5 GHz for the midrange. The highest 
bands, millimeter-wave (mmWave), 
span the 20–60 GHz range. The high-
est frequencies typically have much 
shorter and less robust propagation 
paths due to higher attenuation. How-
ever, the increased directionality can 
support ultradense deployments in 
urban areas and permit high-data-rate 
and low-latency apps that were simply 
not feasible with the available 4G spec-
trum. 5G design calls for significantly 
greater base station density and push-
ing many core services of the network 
to the edge to handle short propaga-
tion paths and novel apps.
The CP is subject to jamming attacks 
from the middle and both ends. End de-
vices, legitimate or rogue, can target the 
CP for DoS and certain other types of 
cyberattacks. At the end of the day, the 
edge node is just another piece of com-
modity silicon running an operating 
system hosting many virtualized apps.9 
Similar attacks, targeting data in transit 
of user information such as location and 
other privacy data, can originate from 
the Internet (used for global backhaul). 
Regarding “the middle,” dense deploy-
ments in urban areas require radio fre-
quency (RF) backhaul that will enable 
classes of attacks not available in 4G.
While the encryption and direc-
tionality of backhaul links will miti-
gate many types of interception and 
manipulation attacks, jamming is 
possible through both RF and physical 
means. The high attenuation and di-
rectionality of mmWave signals per-
mit low-tech jamming solutions such 
as antenna or path blockage. In safety- 
or time-critical apps, such as the In-
dustrial Internet of Things (IIoT) or 
But 5G systems have also become complex  
in the quest to enable the flexibility to meet 
anticipated functional and performance 
requirements over the next 10 years.
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connected vehicle communications, 
DoS jamming attacks on the CP pres-
ent a real threat to public safety and 
have been proven feasible in the 4G 
and, by extension, the 5G CPs.9
In the context of applying the pro-
posed classification taxonomy, jam-
ming a link in the chain of nodes used 
to facilitate IAB (see Figure 2) could be 
used to manipulate artificial intelli-
gence (AI) logic that routes user data to 
the CU connected via N3 to the PSA-UPF. 
If a compromised gNB was inserted 
in the new path determined by AI and 
used to harvest user information, then 
the targeted jamming would be consid-
ered a CPA launched from the UP.
UPAs 
While the transition from 4G to 5 G 
may a lter t he tech n ica l det a i ls of 
UPAs, UPAs tend to be the most heavily 
researched and publicized subset of 5G 
attack vectors. Examples of UPAs that 
originate in the UP include DoS via cell 
jamming, key stealing, and hardware 
vulnerability exploitation. Just as a 
DoS attack can be accomplished via 
multiple methods, a spoofed base sta-
tion (gNB) can be used to accomplish 
a variety of attacks. Using a compro-
mised gNB to deny service to a group 
of UE within the cell would represent 
a UPA launched from the UP. However, 
using the compromised gNB to create a 
database of user credentials and secu-
rity keys by simulating access requests 
to the core network represents a CPA 
launched from the UP.
UE spoofing
Part of the 5G NR appeal lies in its bill-
ing as the “one standard to rule them 
all” by enabling the convergence of the 
previously isolated silos composed of 
V2X, industrial control systems (ICSs), 
the IoT/IIoT, and mobile broadband 
(MBB) communications (among oth-
ers). Although service providers try to 
offer robust authentication methods to 
thwart the use of spoofed (or rogue) 
UE, the added complexity of 5G NR 
creates opportunities for developing 
new classes of UE spoofing attacks. 
For instance, one might leverage the 
integration of ultralow-latency (ULL) 
communications provisioned for safety 
and industrial apps by exploiting known 
vulnerabilities in legacy manufacturing 
stations. As noted previously, industrial 
or safety use cases present new conse-
quences for DoS-type attacks against de-
vices in the UP.
ICSs typically have stringent tim-
ing, availability, and reliability con-
straints that require the ULL promised 
by 5G. These use cases require the ad-
dition of quality-of-service (QoS) provi-
sions to the 5G NR standards or slices 
thereof. These new specifications can, 
in turn, be leveraged to induce new 
classes of DoS attacks.10 For instance, 
the 5G NR standards permit ULL UE to 
preempt transmissions from MBB UE. 
In one recent study, authors simulated 
both throughput degradation via MBB 
preemption and breaking typical ULL 
QoS guarantees using as few as five 
pieces of rogue UE.10 Ultimately, these 
attacks warp 5G’s flexibility to preempt 
normal device-to-base-station commu-
nications with spoofed higher priority 
requests; the resulting DoS does not 
have to be highly effective to break QoS 
guarantees for safety applications.
Cell jamming
The novelty of 5G ensures that many 
of the proposed 5G jamming attacks 
are still theoretical. But, in principle 
at least, individual frequencies or mo-
bile devices (UE) are subject to many 
of the same attacks that have already 
been proven against 4G and are well 
described by Lichtman et al.9
The frequency diversity of 5G NR 
makes it much more difficult for an 
adversary to jam all possible downlinks 
from an entire cell. In turn, this means 
broad-based noise jamming will remain 
effective but require high transmis-
sion powers and be readily observable 
to counterjamming sensors. Selective 
jamming strategies will be stealthier and 
likely more effective at targeting smaller 
sets of UE. Selective jamming strategies 
target specific cell-to-UE connection 
information carried by cell downlinks 
such as the primary synchronization sig-
nal (PSS) and physical broadcast channel 
(PBCH). These attacks would typically 
leverage the cell’s own broadcast infor-
mation to identify and select the specific 
time and frequency blocks to target. 
Note that there are many more potential 
targets than the PSS and PBCH alone; 
Lichtman et al. provide a thorough dis-
cussion of these attacks.9
Base station spoofing
Base station spoofing (both Wi-Fi and 
3G/4G) is a proven attack used by both 
law enforcement and criminals to tar-
get individuals and devices via the UP. 
Rogue base stations can be configured 
to enable different types of attacks. If 
configured to forward connection infor-
mation from UE to the CP and connect to 
a legitimate cellular provider, the base 
station acts as if it was the target’s device. 
By reading or recording the intercepted 
traffic, the base station can impose 
nearly any attack on the connected UE, 
including confidentiality and integrity 
compromise, geolocation, and DoS.11,12 
Less-complex attacks have also been 
demonstrated that do not require the 
breaking of encryption, such as collect-
ing UE identifying data, service down-
grade, and battery-draining attacks.5
Used in conjunction with Shostack’s framework, 
one can assess the policies and mechanisms for 
mitigating the security risks of 5G in addition to 
assessing the goodness of the underlying trust 
assumptions for the security architecture.
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Hardware vulnerability exploitation
The popularity of location-based apps 
has resulted in many providers of tele-
communications chips bundling global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS) 
functionality into their mobile telephone 
system as a system-on-a-chip solution. 
GNSS, being a set of well-documented 
standards designed to work with a low 
signal-to-noise ratio, enables a myriad 
of terrestrial spoofing attacks. For in-
stance, CVE-2019–2254 represents a vul-
nerability applicable to numerous Qual-
comm chip sets that uses the spoofed 
commands sent to the GNSS chip to 
conduct a buffer overflow and execute 
arbitrary code on a system.13,14 The prev-
alence of nonmobile telephone features 
on modern smartphones represents a 
significant attack vector for hardware 
vulnerabilities by increasing the device’s 
attack surface, as discussed previously.
Key catching and stealing
Encryption between UE and RAN uti-
lizes a permanently stored key in the 
UE’s subscriber identification module 
(SIM) card. The IMSI and International 
Mobile Equipment Identity of the UE 
are protected by temporary IDs once 
the device is connected to the RAN. 
However, an attacker can force a situ-
ation where the temporary identifiers 
(IDs) stored in the UE and network fall 
out of synchronization. In this case, 
the network may request the UE to use 
its permanent ID to reestablish com-
munications. In 4G networks, this 
mechanism could be exploited by the 
attacker to force all UEs served by a 
particular gNB to broadcast their IMSI, 
which was done in the clear, referred to 
as IMSI catching. Since the attack uses 
a CP authorization mechanism to steal 
user credentials, it would be a UPA 
launched from the CP.
Additionally, the use of permanent 
symmetric keys has fallen under scru-
tiny after The Great SIM Heist revealed 
a large-scale attack against the SIM pro-
visioning process.4,15,16 Other methods 
for storing permanent authorization 
credentials include embedded uni-
versal integrated circuit cards or some 
other form of “soft SIM” that can be 
remotely provisioned. Adversarial 
manipulation of any remote provi-
sioning process could be used in a DoS 
attack or to enable the connection of 
unauthorized devices to a network. 
Such key stealing operations are UPA 
launched from the UP because the cre-
dentials stored in a SIM card are part 
of the UE.
Timing attacks
Precise time synchronization is essen-
tial for mobile apps, such as the syn-
chronization of base stations to enable 
call handoff.17 While clock synchroni-
zation can be accomplished via cellular 
signals, it can also be accomplished via 
network-based protocols such as the 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) and Preci-
sion Time Protocol (PTP) or by wireless 
signals, such as those from GNSS con-
stellations supporting real-time ki-
nematic positioning. Each method has 
an associated accuracy and interface—
which introduces its own associated set 
of vulnerabilities. Clock synchroniza-
tion protocols such as GNSS are one way 
and are thus susceptible to man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks. PTP is a two-
way clock synchronization protocol, 
where the round-trip time delay can 
be measured to detect MITM attacks. 
However, this alone is insufficient to 
guarantee protocol security.17
Timing attacks could be uti-
l i zed to increase network delays, 
deg rade communication links, or 
TABLE 2. A partially populated 5G attack vector matrix.
Type of Attack
UPA CPA
Attack source UP •  Cell jamming used to conduct DoS attack
•  Spoofed base station conducts DoS to a 
subset of attached UE
•  Spoofed UE used to attach an unauthorized 
device to the network
•  Hardware vulnerability exploitation
•  Key stealing
•  Spoofed gNB obtains user credentials by 
simulating multiple access requests
•  Jam select links in IAB path to reroute user data 
through compromised gNB
•  Modified gNB conducts DoS against multiple 
gNBs attached to 5G channel by falsely 
advertising favorable channel characteristics
CP •  IMSI catching
•  Timing attacks
•  Use privileged access to core network to 
authorize attachment of modified gNB that 
captures user credentials
•  Use privileged access to core network to 
manipulate billing
•  Use privileged access to core network to facilitate 
DoS attack by modifying routing policies, QoS, 
and so on
Just as a DoS attack can be accomplished via 
multiple methods, a spoofed base station can be 
used to accomplish a variety of attacks.
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create opportunities for UE to connect 
to a spoofed network infrastructure. 
Some levels of security against this type 
of attack are offered by the variety of 
timing synchronization options avail-
able to the gNB. An attack that manipu-
lates the timing inputs to the gNB to in-
crease delays or degrade service is a UPA 
launched from the CP since timing is a 
service provided through the CP.
MITIGATIONS AND THE WAY 
AHEAD FOR IMPROVED 
SECURITY IN 5G AND BEYOND
Agreement on a common scheme for 
categorizing security vulnerabilities is a 
required first step to enabling us to be effi-
cient and effective at improving the secu-
rity of mobile telephony. For example, 
the scheme can help us identify areas of 
overlap where investing our scarce time 
and people resources will maximize 
our return on investment in addressing 
potential threats. Vulnerabilities can 
then be identified and investigated by 
using industrial-strength formal meth-
ods, simulations, and experimentation, 
which, in turn, feed into threat modeling 
and security risk reduction. The goal here 
is to systematically improve 5G secu-
rity and inform the research and devel-
opment of follow-on work regarding 
architectures, standards, protocols, 
and implementations. Let’s not repeat 
security missteps that occurred in prior 
generations of mobile telephony.
Table 2 illustrates our vector ma-
trix, which is partially populated using 
the attack examples described previ-
ously. This scheme is invariant to the 
evolution of equipment, standards, 
and implementations, making it pos-
sible to apply it to 6G and beyond—
which may introduce new functional 
planes. It also helps consolidate mul-
tiple attack methods, making common 
threat vectors within the 5G architec-
ture easier to discern and assess.
Each threat warrants a discussion 
of mitigations that are beyond the 
scope of this article. But we can iden-
tify a couple of overarching mitiga-
tion considerations by considering 
two specific attacks discussed previ-
ously: cell jamming and base station 
spoofing.
Regarding selective jamming attacks, 
because most of this “free” targeting 
information is codified in the 5G NR 
standards, mitigating potential attacks in 
scalable, compatible ways is a challeng-
ing and open area of research. Hardware 
changes will have to be avoided to en-
sure backward compatibility. Software 
changes for security may unacceptably 
reduce the data rate or battery life. Be-
cause of the difficulty of changing a 
mature technology, the most effective 
mitigation—restricting the amount 
of timing and frequency detail that is 
provided to UE prior to authentication 
with a base station and encryption of 
the link—will have to be reserved for 6G 
and beyond.
Some of these same mitigations 
would help to address the security 
risks related to base station spoofing. 
Additional service provider mitiga-
tions could include automated cellular 
network sensing and anomaly detec-
tion based on unusual gNB control 
messages (for example, frequent RRC_
REJECT and RRC_IDLE), unusually high 
signal strength reports, or inconsistent 
blacklisted cell data.11 UE solutions 
could involve additional checks on cer-
tain control messages from the base 
station as well as reports to the CP.11 
Both UE and edge reports would effec-
tively increase the number of sensors 
available to a provider to detect mali-
cious and accidental network issues.
Many of the rogue base station mit-
igations could also be implemented 
in software in the CP. While imposing 
computational and data overhead, 
providers can implement these fixes 
relatively quickly. But to ensure smooth 
roaming and protection across cellular 
network operators, some fixes would re-
quire changes to the standards. Standards 
changes are the source of urgency for 
fully identifying 5G threats and mitiga-
tions; 6G standards are currently being 
refined, and the window for accepting 
changes may close before all of the use-
ful changes are identified.18
W e’ve presented a novel scheme for categorizing attack vec-tors based on a dual-plane 
architecture, such as that specified for 5G. 
Given that mobile telephony is part of the 
Internet, applying our scheme requires 
thinking about how other parts of the In-
ternet interact with mobile telephony. The 
Internet can be thought of as an extension 
of the RAN, carrying CP and UE messages. 
With this perspective, how do we classify 
the cyberattacks emanating from outside 
of the mobile telephony environment in 
the proposed scheme? For example, in 
Table 2 we listed timing attacks as UPA 
from the CP. To us, this makes sense if 
NTP or PTP is the feature we are looking 
Timing attacks could be utilized to increase network 
delays, degrade communication links, or create 
opportunities for UE to connect to a spoofed 
network infrastructure.
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at. If, instead, we looked at a border router 
peered with a 5G network, one could ar-
gue that the router is part of the UP since 
it is part of the data-routing path.
Regardless of whether an attacker 
attempts to leverage weaknesses of the 
UP, CP, or both, improving society’s trust 
in the dependability of deployed 5G NR 
networks and the apps they enable will 
be challenging. By embracing the concept 
of the functional-plane split, our taxon-
omy is usable for 6G and beyond while 
remaining simple enough to facilitate en-
gagement and understanding by experts 
across technical domains. By focusing 
on vectors rather than specific methods, 
our scheme can aggregate more detailed 
methodologies and accommodate the 
evolution of mobile telephony technology 
and cyberattacks. The matrix can also be 
scaled as desired, while improved threat 
visualization enables allocating limited 
resources to obtaining the most fruitful 
security enhancements. 
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